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‘To Catch at and Let Go’:   
David Bakhurst ,  Phenomenology and Post -Phenomenology 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines David Bakhurst’s attempt to provide a picture of ‘the 
kinds of beings we are’ that is ‘more realistic’ than rationalism. I argue that 
there is much that is rich and compelling in Bakhurst’s account. Yet I also 
question whether there are ways in which it could be taken further. I 
introduce the discussion by exploring Bakhurst’s engagement with 
phenomenology and, more specifically, Hubert Dreyfus – who enters 
Bakhurst’s horizon on account of his inheritance of the philosophy of John 
McDowell. Whilst I recognise that Bakhurst’s encounter with Dreyfus 
demonstrates his achievements – over rationalism and over Dreyfus – I also 
suggest that it opens up certain questions that remain to be asked of his 
position on account of its conceptualism. These questions originate, not 
from a Dreyfusian phenomenological perspective, but from the post-
phenomenological perspective of Jacques Derrida. Through appealing to 
key Derridean tropes, I aim to show why the conceptual idiom Bakhurst 
retains may hold us back from understanding the open nature of human 
thought. I end by considering what therefore needs to come – and what 
needs to be let go – in order to best do justice to the ‘kinds of beings we 
are’.  
 
I  
 
In this paper, I should like to explore David Bakhurst’s attempt to provide us with a 
‘more realistic’ picture of the ‘kinds of beings we are’ (2011; 2014; 2016). Throughout 
this project, Bakhurst works to defend his position against a potential charge of 
‘rationalism’. One direction from which Bakhurst foresees such a challenge is 
phenomenological or, more specifically, Dreyfusian. Hubert Dreyfus comes onto 
Bakhurst’s horizon because of his inheritance of the philosophy of John McDowell. 
McDowell became involved in a well-known debate with Dreyfus over the question of 
whether human experience is conceptual ‘all the way out’. Through an appeal to the 
phenomenology of ‘everyday coping’, Dreyfus works to suggest that it is not, and claims 
that McDowell’s conviction (shared by Bakhurst) that it is leads to an unduly narrow 
conception of the human being. As well as being entertained by Bakhurst himself, the 
‘McDowell-Dreyfus Debate’ continues to command much attention in mainstream 
philosophy. It is also invoked in recent commentary on Bakhurst’s work in the 
philosophy of education.i  
 
The Dreyfus-Bakhurst encounter will be the starting point for our discussion here, too. 
But this is not to say that I am seeking to ‘resolve’ the longstanding debate. Nor will I be 
attempting to rehabilitate a Dreyfusian-line of argument against Bakhurst. In fact, my 
purpose in this paper is not to negatively critique or ‘defeat’ Bakhurst’s account at all – 
for I find much that is rich and compelling in the picture he presents. What I should 
like to do, however, is move through Bakhurst’s response to Dreyfus in a way that 
illuminates his achievements – yet at the same time opens up certain questions that, in 
my view, stand to be asked of his position.  
 
The questions I want to raise originate, not so much from a phenomenological 
perspective, as from a post-phenomenological reading. More specifically, they are 
informed by certain tropes from the philosophy of Jacques Derrida. I call Derrida’s 
perspective ‘post-phenomenological’ here so as to highlight the way that, contrary to 
what is sometimes supposed, Derrida’s thinking is not widely obscurantist or relativistic, 
but rather shares the general phenomenological imperative to do justice to what is 
experienced as it is experienced. Put otherwise, Derrida – like phenomenologists, and 
like Bakhurst himself – is after a ‘more realistic’ picture of the ‘kinds of beings we are’. 
Yet Derrida’s thinking was also marked by an effort to move beyond certain limitations 
he perceived within phenomenological philosophy, on account of its failure to remain 
faithful to the project of setting aside metaphysical assumptions and attending to the 
‘things themselves’. I will not discuss Derrida’s concerns with phenomenology further 
here. My focus is rather to show how a Derridean approach can open up some new 
questions for Bakhurst’s position. Raising such questions will not, let me re-emphasise, 
mean that we seek to overturn his account. But it will open us to possible ways in which 
Bakhurst’s picture of ‘the kinds of beings we are’ could be taken further. I am not sure 
if Bakhurst would want to follow us in these directions. I hope to demonstrate the value 
of what comes, however, if we allow such ways to be open. 
 
II 
 
Introducing Bakhurst 
 
Let us start with Bakhurst’s picture, and why he comes to engage with Dreyfus. 
Bakhurst begins his portrait in The Formation of Reason with a sketch of the human 
being as the ‘autonomous agent’ – one who is able to ‘determine what to think and do 
in light of what there is reason to think and do’ (p. 72). For Bakhurst, what is distinctive 
about the human mind is our ability, in all but exceptional circumstances, to believe 
and act in accordance with ‘considerations that favour our believing and acting’ (2014, 
p. 2).ii We are, to employ the well-known terminology, beings who are ‘responsive to 
reasons’ and who come, via a Bildungsprozess, to inhabit the ‘space of reasons’. 
 
Bakhurst turns to the philosophy of John McDowell to develop his account. One of the 
key features of McDowell’s philosophy Bakhurst inherits is his commitment to 
conceptualism. This is the belief that human thought and experience is pervaded by 
conceptual content: it is conceptual ‘all the way out’. Now, McDowell came to argue for 
this as a result of his desire to overcome the ‘myth of the given’: the traditional 
philosophical idea that human experience is grounded in a pre-conceptual sensible 
manifold, which is then organised and thematised by the understanding. Against this, 
McDowell suggests that our experiences of the world need to always already have the 
kind of content that can ‘“serve up” reasons for judgement, reasons for the judging 
subject’ (Schear, 2013, p. 286). Such a conception informs Bakhurst’s own depiction of 
what is at stake in our ability to be ‘responsive to reasons’, for ‘it is only in virtue of its 
conceptual content that experience can bear directly on rationality and judgement’ 
(2011, p. 177). 
 
As far as accounts of the ‘kinds of beings we are’ go, what Bakhurst says here makes a 
contentious start. One reason for this is that McDowell’s commitment to conceptualism 
has been the source of much debate. The origin of this is Hubert Dreyfus.  
 
Introducing Dreyfus 
 
Dreyfus takes exception to the claim that human behaviour and action is conceptual ‘all 
the way out’ on the grounds that it promulgates the ‘myth of the mental’ – thereby 
presenting an unduly narrow construal of the human being. Dreyfus’ argument has 
been articulated and refined in various ways, and it will not be possible to do full justice 
to it here. The main feature of it, however, is the appeal to ‘absorbed coping’. This is a 
mode of wordly comportment that Dreyfus articulates with the help of insights gleaned 
from certain phenomenological philosophers – most frequently Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty. Dreyfus’ basic claim is that such behaviour (examples of which range 
from switching on a light, to making a cup of tea) presents a challenge to the 
conceptualist, precisely because the kinds of experiences they involve are free from 
conceptual content.  To understand Dreyfus’ claim here it is helpful to recognise that 
there is a tradition in philosophy of associating the ‘conceptual’ with possession of ideas 
or representations that are fully expressible and describable. This is the understanding 
of the ‘conceptual’ that Dreyfus adopts. Put otherwise, Dreyfus reads a commitment to 
conceptualism as a commitment to the idea that a deliberate and detached thinking 
process stands behind human behaviour and action. And it is for this reason that 
Dreyfus construes episodes of ‘absorbed coping’ as non-conceptual experiences. 	   The 
player on the football pitch, as Dreyfus puts it, acts without her ‘mind on’ what she is 
doing; she is ‘coping concretely without thinking at all’ (2005, p. 12). Such episodes are 
free from conceptual content, then, because no articulated representations stand behind 
what is here ‘directly lived’ (2015, p. 17-18).  
 
Dreyfus goes on to argue that such ‘mindlessness’ is not only a contingent feature of 
what happens in episodes of absorbed coping – it is, rather, a necessary condition of its 
happening at all. Turning our minds towards our actions would, after all, ‘disrupt’ the 
smooth execution of the activity. Furthermore, Dreyfus realises that engaged modes of 
behaviour are not only occasional happenings in our being-in-the-world – they are, 
rather, the more basic and everyday ways in which our relations to the world take place. 
Dreyfus therefore comes to affirm that such modes of engagement constitute the 
‘ground level’ of our being-in-the-world: ‘access to an independent thinkable world’, he 
explains, ‘requires as its background a familiar graspable world’ (2013, p. 16). 
 
Bakhurst’s Reply 
 
The central lever in Bakhurst’s counter to Dreyfus is his claim that the 
phenomenologist has moved too quickly in jettisoning concepts from the sphere of 
absorbed coping. Put better, for Bakhurst, Dreyfus has moved too traditionally – for 
the kind of conceptualism McDowell adopts does not follow the narrow account of 
concepts we find in traditional philosophy, but embraces a wider construal. This means, 
pace Dreyfus, that McDowell (and Bakhurst who follows him) does not promulgate the 
mentalistic myth that ‘the work of reason must be formal, abstract, situation-
independent, rule-bound or otherwise “rationalistic”’ (2011, p. 178). 
 
In a recent paper, Bakhurst has used the example of a group of jazz musicians 
improvising together to demonstrate this point more fully. He introduces the example 
by echoing the Dreyfusian line that absorbed activity takes place without the 
accompaniment of articulate, formulated reasons. The jazz players, as he puts it, are 
simply ‘in the groove’; they ‘do not formulate and entertain their reasons prior to acting 
on them’. Nevertheless, Bakhurst adds, we should continue to see such behaviour as 
manifesting ‘responsiveness to reasons’, for it remains pervaded by conceptuality in a 
number of ways. Bakhurst explains: 
 
[T]hey understand themselves as engaged in a performance; as interpreting 
a jazz standard in a certain kind of style; as soloing or harmonizing or 
accompanying etc. Such concepts determine the unity and coherence of the 
activity and the standards by which their playing can measured … Of 
course, if the musicians are asked to give reasons for their musical 
decisions, their response need not take the form of an argument. They 
might simply cite some features of the situation that prompted her action 
(“The tempo was too slow”; “Jack needed a less busy accompaniment”). Or 
they might find it easier to demonstrate their reasons musically than to 
explain verbally. Moreover, there will be cases where the musicians are 
insufficiently articulate to express their reasons … But so long as we see 
their activity as guided by an appreciation of considerations that determine 
how it is appropriate to act, then we see their performance as manifesting 
responsiveness to reasons. (pp. 4-5). 
 
Bakhurst appears to make two claims about the ways we might understand the 
conceptual nature of jazz improvisation here. Firstly, there is the claim that some sense 
of the nature of ‘performance’; of ‘soloing’; or of ‘accompanying’ needs to be at work in 
order for the jazz players’ improvisation to be possible as jazz improvisation – certain 
concepts need to be in play order to make the jazz players’ improvisation possible in 
the first place. Secondly there is the claim that, nevertheless, such concepts do not need 
to be ‘in play’ in any explicit manner (either during or after the performance); we can 
ascribe conceptual competence to the jazz players even though, when asked to explain 
their musical decisions in the performance, they are not able to offer fully articulated 
syllogisms about the way they proceed. Indeed, Bakhurst goes so far as to claim that we 
can ascribe it even if the players are themselves ‘insufficiently articulate’ to express 
reasons at all.  
 
It is worth registering that Bakhurst’s claims at this point draw upon McDowell’s notion 
of ‘demonstrative’ concepts: an expanded idea of concept possession whereby, as Peter 
Poellner puts it, ‘what is sufficient for justifiably ascribing possession of a concept to a 
subject … is a referential and recognitional capacity’ (2003, p, 38). The basic idea is that 
conceptual competence can be manifest in ways that go beyond verbal and 
representational articulation. Thus, for example, while I might not have the term 
‘crimson’ as part of my verbal repertoire, if I am able to show facility in other ways (say, 
by pointing correctly to this shade of colour) I can be said to be in possession of the 
concept. Concepts, as Bakhurst himself puts it, can be manifest ‘in the doing’ of an 
activity; they are not solely the constituents of the propositional domain. 
 
Does Bakhurst get the better of Dreyfus here? I believe so. Yet it is important to be 
careful about what I am claiming here. As I stated in the introduction, I am not aiming 
to ‘resolve’ the longstanding debate between Dreyfus and conceptualism (Bakhurst’s or 
McDowell’s) in the present paper. I am interested in the Bakhurst-Dreyfus encounter, 
rather, for the way it brings to light some of the advances in Bakhurst’s position – over 
rationalism and over Dreyfus – and, at the same time, opens up certain questions that 
remain to be asked of it. Having now sketched the outline of the Bakhurst-Dreyfus 
debate, let us start to unravel this double thread a little further. 
 
III 
 
Expansions and Advances 
 
Let us start with the positives. Bakhurst’s response to Dreyfus is a compelling one. By 
making the move to ‘expand’ our understanding of the terms ‘concept’ and the 
‘conceptual’ Bakhurst suggests that a conceptually driven construal of human beings as 
‘responsive to reasons’ can, pace Dreyfus, present a rich and broad depiction of ‘the 
kinds of beings we are’. Moreover, Bakhurst works to imply that Dreyfus is himself 
thinking too narrowly – or too rationalistically – when he expels concepts from the 
realm of absorbed coping. Indeed, when read against Bakhurst’s more detailed 
illustration, Dreyfus’ claims that episodes of absorbed coping take place in an 
‘unthinking’ and therefore conceptually devoid sphere may well start to look somewhat 
simplistic. And it is perhaps worth registering at this point that when Dreyfus talks about 
the ‘mindless’ nature of absorbed coping, as Peter Poellner (2003 pp. 48=49) points 
out, this seems to involve not only the idea that there is no thematic awareness of the 
specific activity being engaged in (for example, playing jazz or feeling sad), but that there 
is no awareness of the ‘experience of acting’ itself (of playing or feeling as such). 
Dreyfus’ depiction of absorbed coping, as ‘mindless’ could, then, be read in a strong – 
and potentially strongly problematic – sense.  
 
It is possible that Bakhurst (and we) are being a little unfair to Dreyfus here, however. 
Playing jazz is a highly complex activity, which requires engagement on a number of 
levels (although not a type of detached ratiocination, as Bakhurst has aptly shown). Yet 
Dreyfus’ discussion of absorbed coping seemed to centre on more basic, ‘everyday’ 
activities – such as hammering a nail, turning on the kettle, or opening a door. It 
concerns, that is, the type of engagement Heidegger depicts as ‘ready to hand’ – in 
which the kind of intellectual conditions Bakhurst is able to invoke in his jazz playing 
example are neither as rich nor, perhaps, as compelling. 
 
Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether Dreyfus’ account of absorbed coping – 
even when understood as embracing only our more everyday, ‘ready to hand’ activities 
– is adequate. Indeed, many commentators who are sympathetic to a 
phenomenological perspective have critiqued Dreyfus’ account, particularly due to his 
portrayal of absorbed coping as a ‘mindless’ activity.iii Let me outline one way in which 
this concern could be articulated. Recall that Dreyfus wants to combat the rationalistic 
picture that behind human thought and action there stands deliberate and detached 
reasoning processes. To do this, he claims there is a sphere of absorbed coping wherein 
our experiences are ‘directly lived’ and we engage with the world ‘without thinking at 
all’. Dreyfus comes to position these as the ‘ground level’ of engaged coping, and states 
that ‘thinking’ goes on in the ‘conceptual upper stories of the edifice’ (p. 19-20). By and 
through this move, however, Dreyfus seems to imply that the kind of deliberate and 
detached thinking processes he objects to are not problematic in themselves – they are 
just not present in the sphere of absorbed coping. Put otherwise, while Dreyfus casts 
ratiocination as a less pervasive mode of human experience (engaged coping is, after all, 
the ‘ground level’), it still, nevertheless, pervades somewhere (in the ‘conceptual upper 
stories’). My worry is that this leads Dreyfus to promulgate certain rationalistic 
assumptions in spite of himself. For what grounds do we have for assuming that we 
should expel ‘thinking’ from the realm of absorbed coping? Such a conclusion only 
follows if we equate thinking with (a traditional view of) forming abstracted and 
detached representations. It only follows, that is, if we continue to cleave to an 
intellectualist and mentalistic image of thinking. But this is to give thinking over to the 
rationalist. More specifically, it is to grant the rationalist their picture of thinking and to 
fail to see, beyond this, the possibility of any alternative.  
 
Bakhurst’s approach seems to me to fare rather better. For Bakhurst appears to 
recognise that what is needed to defeat the rationalist is an enriched, ‘more realistic’ 
account of rational thought itself. Yet Bakhurst also allows a central role for concepts 
and the conceptual within his alternative. It is through his expanded idea of concepts, 
we might say, that Bakhurst comes to present his expanded account of the mind. Let us 
now turn to say something about this feature in Bakhurst’s account more directly. 
 
Questioning Concepts 
 
The way Bakhurst reads the ‘conceptual’ is, as we saw above, non-traditional. Perhaps 
we might say it is artful.iv The traditional way of thinking about concepts in philosophy 
is, as we also noted above, in terms of representations that are fully expressible and 
describable. More specifically, the notion of ‘concepts’ is often associated with general 
terms and general ideas. ‘At least part of what this means’, as Simon Glendinning 
(2000, p. 276) points out, is that ‘we must relate to them as having an identity which is 
independent of any particular occasion of their use’. In other words, talking about 
concepts is conductive to an abstract way of thinking. Indeed the whole point of a 
‘general idea’ or ‘general term’ in traditional philosophy is that we achieve it by 
abstracting away from specific instantiations of objects and forming a more general 
thought (of a triangle, for example, or a shoe). Furthermore, as Glendinning goes on to 
note, it becomes ‘very tempting’ once we go down this path to construe someone’s 
possession of a concept in terms a ‘mental grasp’ of a form or identity that is fully 
contained and anticipated in the present (2000, p. 276). Hence to say that someone 
possesses a concept, on a traditional reading at the very least, gives the impression that 
they are in possession of something definite and stable, firm and fixed. After all, the 
term ‘concept’ in German is Begriffen – which connotes the idea of a grip and a hold, 
of catching and containing. 
 
My intention in mentioning all of this is not to build up to the claim that Bakhurst’s 
more artful sense of concepts and the conceptual is surreptitiously a full-blown, 
traditional form of conceptualism. Neither do I mean to suggest that, owing to its 
heritage, all talk about concepts and the conceptual is problematically outdated and 
should be done away with. What I should like to question, however, is whether, given 
the connotations that come along with such talk in philosophy, the language of concepts 
and the conceptual is itself the best way to get clear about the ‘the kinds of beings we 
are’. More strongly, the question I want to pose is whether Bakhurst’s retention of the 
conceptual idiom – even in the more expanded form he embraces – obscures some of 
the ways in which our thinking and experiencing the world gets going.  
 
This is a claim that needs to be handled carefully, and we will spend some time 
exploring it in the sections that are to come. Let us begin here with a brief reference to 
Wittgenstein – possibly a more familiar figure to Bakhurst, for reasons we shall come to 
see in a moment. In his ‘Consideration of Rule-Following’ Wittgenstein examines the 
problems with the traditional philosophical idea that knowing how to follow a rule is a 
matter of having some explicit thought or formula in the mind, running alongside the 
activity. For Wittgenstein, such an assumption is at best peculiar, and at worst a 
philosophical distortion, not in the least because it is contradicted by the way rule-
following happens in daily life. I see an arrow pointing left and I turn that way; I want to 
move this wheelbarrow of compost from one end of the garden to the other, so I pick 
up the handles and push. No interior monologue accompanies my undertaking of such 
activities – this is simply what I do.  
 
Now, we might be tempted at this point – as Dreyfus perhaps would be – to say that we 
thus follow rules ‘unthinkingly’. Yet Wittgenstein himself questioned such a move, 
recognising that it is made out of the habit of associating thinking with that deliberate, 
detached way of cognising favoured by the rationalist. Rather than take such a route, 
Wittgenstein adopts a subtler – and more radical – approach. For he argues that rule 
following is itself a form intelligent behaviour – even though, to employ Lee Braver’s 
phrase, it involves ‘a form of intelligence that doesn’t look like what we expect thinking 
to be’ (2012, p. 140). The gestalt switch Wittgenstein calls for is achieved by re-thinking 
intelligent behaviour as conditioned, not by some inner phenomenon, but rather by 
contexts, conventions and practices. 
 
Without going any further with Wittgenstein, let us note some points of connection 
with Bakhurst that, I think, may come through here. For, Bakhurst’s discussion of jazz 
playing, on one level, comes close to offering a kind of Wittgensteinian argument. 
Indeed, Bakhurst himself gestures towards the contexts and conventions that enable 
jazz playing to go on – he talks, we may recall, of the need for the jazz players to have a 
sense of ‘soloing’; of ‘harmonising’; of what it means to be ‘improvising’. Now, 
Bakhurst portrays such conventions in conceptual terms: they are construed as part of 
the (broadly understood) conceptual content necessary for the experience of playing 
jazz. Yet it is interesting to note that, for Wittgenstein, conventions and practices can 
proceed in a host of different ways – many of which are unforeseen. Rule following, put 
otherwise, is open to development. It is precisely for this reason that any explanation of 
how to follow a rule will itself be open-ended and partial; as Charles Taylor puts it, 
‘every explanation leaves some other potential issue unresolved’ (1997, p. 166). 
Conventions and practices might make possible our rule following, then, but they 
should not to be thought of as securing a certain way of going on. There is we might say, 
an ‘openness’ – that is there in the conditions for our rule-following behaviour and also 
in the ways we come to follow rules. Is this openness present in Bakhurst’s conceptually 
driven account? Perhaps we are asking this question too soon.  To approach it more 
gradually, let us now turn to Derrida. 
 
IV 
 
A Post-Phenomenological Perspective 
 
Notably, the turn we want to introduce at this stage in our discussion could have been 
made by re-reading Bakhurst himself. More specifically, it could have been introduced 
by looking again at Bakhurst’s argument for the conceptual nature of jazz playing. This, 
we may recall, concerns the way the jazz players are able to give an account of why they 
went on in the way they did. Because it makes sense to ask the jazz players to explain 
their musical decisions, and because the players are themselves able to give reasons for 
their actions, Bakhurst suggests, we should see their behaviour as being ‘permeated with 
the conceptual’ (2011, p. 177). 
 
On the surface, what Bakhurst says here supports his ‘official position’: that 
conceptualism is broader than rationalism. When read in light of this, Bakhurst’s claims 
that the jazz players may only give accounts that are vague; may only show their reasons 
demonstratively; and may not even be able to articulate their reasons at all seems to be 
an attempt to do justice to the broader and more concrete ways in which we manifest 
our rationality. Yet a question can be asked about the status Bakhurst accords to the 
non-explicit kinds of explanations invoked here, which makes matters rather more 
complex. Notably, while the answer is somewhat tacit in his discussion of the jazz 
players, it comes to the fore clearly in Bakhurst’s fuller reflection on non-explicitness 
and inarticulacy in The Formation of Reason. Here, Bakhurst aligns himself with the 
McDowellian claim that, while it might not be the case that ‘the subject must already be 
able to put it into words’, the fact remains that human experiences ‘must be the sort of 
thing that can be entertained in thought and encompassed by language’ (2011, p. 189). 
Of course, such a commitment relates to the wider basis of Bakhurst’s conceptualism – 
the idea that human experiences must be always already thematised by the 
understanding. For Bakhurst, then, all must be conceptualisable in principle, even 
though it may not be in fact. Read in the light of this, however, we come to recognise 
that when Bakhurst talks about moments of being non-explicit and inarticulate, he 
understands these in what can be called a ‘contingent’ sense. Put otherwise, the 
inarticulacy and non-explicitness invoked in Bakhurst’s account has the status of being 
not-yet-articulate and not-yet-explicit.  
 
Prima facie this might not look like a very significant point. But a Derridean   
perspective makes possible an alternative understanding of the notions of inarticulacy 
and non-explicitness – which goes beyond the sense of the ‘not-yet-articulate’ or the 
‘not-yet-explicit’. As Simon Glendinning puts it making a related point, Derrida’s 
thinking embraces ‘a sense of indefiniteness’, which is ‘not just an occasional or 
‘pragmatic’ eventuality’, but is rather ‘internal to the sense of words as such’ (2000, p. 
274-276). Of course, Glendinning’s phrasing refers us to the way that Derrida’s 
alternative gets developed in the context of a discussion about language. It may be 
difficult for us, then, to see how such a perspective bears directly on our concerns – for 
Bakhurst’s account does not (explicitly) deal with questions of language. Yet we would 
miss the point of Derrida’s philosophy if we took his account to have implications only 
for questions of language (something Glendinning himself shows). Such claims might, at 
this stage, look rather vague and ambitious. In what follows, we need to show how we 
can take them seriously. 
 
A Turn to Language 
 
It may be helpful to introduce Derrida’s position by way of a contrast to traditional 
philosophical depictions of language as a vehicle – ‘a means of transport … of a 
meaning, and moreover of a unified meaning’ (Derrida, 1988 [1972], p. 1). Such 
‘representationalist’ accounts have an established philosophical pedigree. Aristotle, 
Augustine and then Locke laid the foundations with their conception that language 
‘translates’ thoughts (private, inner contents), and ‘transports’ them from one person to 
another. Derrida notices that such construals have been drawn in the light of what 
appears to happen with phonetic signs (speech acts), whereby the necessary presence of 
a speaker and listener enables the direct and immediate communication of thought. Yet 
this representational function also comes to be extended to graphic signs (written 
words) – with notably negative results. For the distinctiveness of the written mark lies in 
the fact that it can function when the original speaker and listener are not present. The 
written mark therefore lacks the immediacy and directness of the spoken word.  
 
Now, on account of this, the written mark introduces ambiguity and indeterminacy into 
our language use – of the kind illustrated in Terry Eagleton’s well-known example of 
the sign ‘Dogs Must Be Carried on the Escalator’ (does this mean, for example, that if 
you have a dog you must pick it up when travelling on the escalator? Or does it mean 
you have to have a dog before you are even allowed to board the escalator?). While 
Eagleton’s example is an amusing one, Derrida points out that philosophers have been 
less than amused. In writing, words are interpretable, translatable, and readable in new 
ways. The possibility of such ambiguity and openness has led philosophers to 
profoundly mistrust writing.v If we view language as serving only a representational role, 
we can understand why. For, if meaning is not communicated faithfully, then language 
appears to be failing its ‘true’ purpose. The written mark therefore becomes suspect: 
‘not a guise for language, but a disguise’ (Derrida, 1976 [1967], p. 35).  
 
In his own account, Derrida seeks to overturn the philosophical mistrust of writing by 
challenging the very conception of language it is built upon. This is the motivation 
behind Derrida’s well-known saying ‘there is nothing outside the text’ – a claim that has 
been read as wildly contentious, but on one level attests to the way that meaning is not 
secured via some inner, intentional content but rather depends on contexts, conditions 
and conventions. Of course, Derrida is not alone in making such claims. Wittgenstein, 
for example, similarly challenged the view that words get their meaning from being 
attached to ideas, and argued instead that ‘meaning is use’. From what we have already 
seen of Wittgenstein in this paper, this should not come as a surprise. There is a clear 
relation between Wittgenstein’s anti-representational account of language and his anti-
intellectualism – both are ways of challenging the tendency to ‘metaphysicalise’ and 
posit private, inner contents behind what we say and do. Certain lines of connection 
between our present discussion of language and our earlier discussion of the nature of 
rational thought hereby come into view. But let us remain with Derrida a little longer. 
 
Iterabil i ty 
 
 
A central feature in Derrida’s alternative picture of language is ‘iterability’. Through 
this, Derrida refers to the way that words can be repeated and put to use in new and 
different contexts. We already noted this ‘reusable’ feature of language above, and we 
can now say more specifically that such ambiguity and indeterminacy comes about as a 
result of the iterable structure of writing. Only writing? A question emerges here, for 
spoken words also have this feature. Indeed, repeatability seems to be part and parcel 
of what makes a sign a sign; to invoke Simon Glendinning, ‘it is simply inconceivable 
that something should be, say, a word and yet not be capable of being repeated again in 
new contexts’ (2000, p. 276). The suggestion here is not simply that words are, by some 
contingent empirical fact, capable of being re-used on other occasions. The claim is 
rather that reusability is a constitutive feature of signs being what they are. To use 
Derrida’s phrasing (1976 [1967], p. 50), it is the nature of the sign ‘not to be proximate 
to itself’, but to refer beyond itself to a system of signs which themselves refer on to 
other signs, which themselves refer on to other signs, which themselves refer on… The 
absence that is traditionally taken as a trait only of the written mark thus comes to be 
seen as a feature of all language. All language, is originally writing.  
 
Important consequences follow. Insofar as language is originally writing, there is always 
something that overflows any present act of communication: a ‘non-saturation’ of the 
sign. What we say is thus never articulated with complete explicitness, definiteness and 
disambiguity. This does not mean, crucially, that nothing is ever articulated; nothing can 
ever be made explicit (a sceptical claim). Neither does it mean that things can be 
articulated or made explicit in any old way we like (a relativistic claim). But it does lead 
us to re-think what is at stake in acts of explicit articulation. For any present use of 
language is conditioned by and through its ‘necessary structural relation to an iteration 
that is another such event which is not present’ (Glendinning, 2000, p. 282). Thus the 
conditions of possibility of explicit articulation are at the same time the conditions of its 
impossibility. Language, to use Gordon Bearn’s terms, ‘broaches and breeches’ (1998, 
p. 75).  Could (and would) Bakhurst consent to such a picture? What would be the 
implications of his doing (or not doing)? 
 
(Re-)Questioning Concepts  
 
Let me try to explain why I think we have reason to ask such questions. This relates to 
the concerns I introduced above, regarding the conceptual idiom. Part of my worry is 
this: when we talk about human thinking in conceptual terms – whether we take this in 
an ‘expanded’ sense à la Bakhurst or not – we seem to continue a commitment to an 
idea(l) or norm of articulation and explicitness. This might be contentious, but I think 
such a commitment can be seen in Bakhurst. For, as we saw above, despite his 
suggestion that conceptual competence can be manifest ‘non-explicitly’, and despite the 
fact he recognises we can be ‘insufficiently articulate’ to give reasons for our actions, it 
remains the case for Bakhurst that such experiences could be made articulate and 
explicit (if the conditions were more favourable).  Put otherwise, all those kinds of 
experiences that Bakhurst wants to embrace with his (broader) notion of conceptual 
competence remain the kinds of things that could be ‘conceptualised’. Yet this is 
precisely the idea(l) that the argument for iterability calls into question. For, following 
Derrida’s account, whatever is grasped or made explicit is only done so partially and 
incompletely, and on the basis of a modification of a more general inarticulacy and 
non-explicitness. Derrida’s account therefore leads us away from understanding 
inarticulacy and non-explicitness within the horizon of a norm of explicitness or 
articulateness (against which inarticulacy and non-explicitness are understood 
‘contingently’). What it takes us towards is the notion that, qua iterable units, whatever 
is articulated and made explicit is so on the basis of a modification of a more general 
inarticulacy and non-explicitness.vi 
 
I want to go a bit further with my worries here. For I should also like to question 
whether a commitment to a norm of explicitness and articulation itself harbours a 
commitment (maybe only tacitly, maybe only residually) to the grip and the grasp – 
which we identified as thematics of the more traditional way of understanding the 
‘conceptual’ in philosophy. Let me introduce this via another example. A number of 
‘Romantic’ writers, going against the abstract, intellectualised model of the human being 
dominant in their time, turned to privilege the body as our mode of relation to the 
world (‘O for a life of sensation rather than thought!’vii). But a problem could be seen 
here. For the inversion attempted did not serve to displace the underpinning 
assumptions of the view the Romantics were trying to challenge. Put otherwise, a re-
orientation towards the body works to repeat, albeit on a different level, the belief that 
there is or needs to be a higher sanction through which ‘humanity’ can be verifiable 
(not ‘Reason’ but the ‘Body’). Now, earlier in this paper we agreed that Bakhurst makes 
advances over Dreyfus insofar as he does not commit to straightforward binarisms. 
Bakhurst, we said, recognises that what is needed to get beyond rationalism is not an 
appeal to ‘unthinking’ – but a reformulation of what rational thought itself consists in. I 
readily recognise this. Yet I also wonder whether Bakhurst could be read as making a 
problematic inversion on another level – not concerning thinking, but concerning 
concepts. For Bakhurst wants to replace the ‘narrow’ view that concepts are the 
constituents of deliberate and detached thinking, with the ‘expanded’ view that we can 
manifest concepts in ‘the doing’. Yet his doing so could be seen as leaving in tact the 
underpinning assumption of (narrow) conceptualism: that things can be brought to full 
articulation and explicitness. Put otherwise, he could be seen as retaining the idea 
(maybe only tacitly, maybe only residually) that what we ideally want or need are 
understandings and explanations that are definite and stable, firm and fixed.  
 
We might be feeling a little uneasy about making such claims against Bakhurst on the 
basis of the arguments we have rehearsed thus far. Indeed, what we have seen from 
Derrida has provided us with an interesting picture of how language works – but how 
can we move from here to make bigger claims? In the next section, we will come to 
develop these ideas further. For now it is perhaps worth simply saying that, at the very 
least, a conceptual idiom risks looking insufficiently sensitive to the possibilities – and 
impossibilities – through which our thinking gets going in the first place. It risks an 
account of the ‘kinds of beings we are’, that is, which fails to do justice to the openness 
we have come to approach through the iterability of the sign.  
 
V 
 
‘The Space of Reasons’ and the Text 
 
 
The transition we are seeking to make at this point – viz. to explore the implications of 
the post-phenomenological account of language for Bakhurst’s position – may be 
helped by an initial appeal to Heidegger. In his early philosophy, Heidegger presents us 
with a picture of human being-in-the-world that seeks to get beyond the construal of the 
human being as a disengaged ‘subject’ who faces passive ‘objects’ in the word. A key 
part of Heidegger’s account is his notion of the ‘background’. This attests to the 
contexts or horizons through which our relations to the world are made possible. We 
come to things, as Heidegger puts it, with a ‘fore-having’ and a ‘fore-sight’ – things do 
not appear to us as abstracted singular ‘objects’ but as shaped and formed by history, 
and as always already interpreted within a web of possibilities. Notably, there is an 
overlap between what Heidegger says here and the kind of position developed by 
Bakhurst. As we saw earlier, part of what Bakhurst claims about the conceptual nature 
of absorbed behaviour bears relation to the Wittgensteinian claim that what we do 
always takes place within a context, in light of certain conventions and in line with 
certain practices. This already sounds somewhat like a Heideggerian ‘fore-having’ and a 
‘fore-sight’, but there is more to be said. For Bakhurst’s claims about the contextual 
conditions here reflects his broader commitment to offering a ‘socio-historical’ account 
of the ‘kinds of beings we are’ – one that positions human beings within culturally and 
historically structured (and, in turn, modified) ‘space of reasons’. As Paul Standish has 
observed (2016a, p. 107), Bakhurst’s development of this (originally Sellarsian and 
McDowellian) notion has many traits that could be fruitfully compared to the 
Heideggerian conception of the ‘world’.  
 
Yet, as Standish also recognises, Heidegger enacts a ‘turn’ in his later work, by moving 
to consider more fully the place of language in human being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s 
early analyses of the ‘background’ had of course included a place for language (how 
could they not?) – and here we note another point of connection to Bakhurst, for 
whom language is a key aspect of the socio-historical ‘space of reasons’ we come to 
inhabit. Yet Heidegger’s later work comes to think about language in more directly 
productive terms. Hence Heidegger’s oft cited phrase that ‘language speaks’ – which is 
suggestive of both the way we as humans speak language and how language speaks 
through us. Beyond its signifying function, then, Heidegger seeks to draw our attention 
to the ‘poetic’ element of language – its capacity for ‘letting be’ (Dichtung). Now, 
Bakhurst never speaks about language in these exact terms, but I suspect he would not 
be too worried about according a productive role to language in the ‘space of reasons’.viii 
Yet Heidegger’s turn to language involves more than this, for what he is claiming here is 
not just that language is a productive part of the background, but that it is the 
background itself: ‘language is the house of Being: in its home man dwells’ (2010 [1947] 
p. 145). Put otherwise, Heidegger sees language as the condition of possibility for the 
coming to be of things in the world in the first place. As Timothy Clark explains it, 
language is ‘not merely an entity upon the stage of the world, it is that stage, that “space” 
in which alone things become apparent’ (p. 29, italics in the original).  
 
When Derrida discusses language he follows Heidegger’s lead – but also takes him 
further. There is not the space to offer a full analysis of Derrida’s relation with 
Heidegger on this point, but perhaps a key aspect to foreground is the former’s concern 
that the latter is ‘too pious’ in his characterisation of language as ‘letting be’. At the risk 
of simplifying matters, we might see Derrida’s concern here as stemming from the 
sense that, despite moving beyond the traditional account of language in many ways, 
Heidegger himself overlooks the very iterable structure of language we have just 
explored. As Christopher Norris puts it, ‘[Derrida] wants to insist that all thinking about 
language, philosophy and culture must henceforth be conceived within the context of a 
massively extended “writing”’ (1987, p. 21). And this means, crucially, that any 
unconcealment through language always itself take place within a ‘double movement’ of 
broaching and breaching. Extending Clark’s earlier metaphor, it means that the ‘stage of 
appearing’ is one that is ‘ itself touched by the necessity of re-presentation’ (p. 122).  
 
It is important to be clear that the ‘re-presentation’ referred to here is not the 
‘representation’ of traditional philosophy (that which reflects something already there, 
in itself, prior to language). The image is rather, to borrow Clark’s terms again, of a 
mirror facing inwards (not outwards) – hence casting a multiplicity of reflections, 
inflections and traces. ix  And this means that whatever is ‘here now’ comes to be 
understood as dependent on what cannot be ‘here now’, which mediates and conditions 
its ‘present’ character. Another way of putting this is to the say that the context in which 
we live our lives, following Derrida, comes to be understood as a textual space. For just 
as a literary text, to be what it is, must bear ‘a whole network of articulated themes and 
assumptions whose meaning everywhere links up with other texts, other genres or 
topics of discourse’ (Norris, 1987, p. 26), so too are our lives lived within the horizon of 
a more general ‘text’ that is open to further correlations, connections and contexts. And 
there is ‘nothing outside the text.’ 
 ‘Responsiveness to Reasons’ and Responsibil i ty  
 
What we have just said has taken us quite far into some of the most difficult aspects of 
Derrida’s philosophy, and we have moved quite quickly. Perhaps in doing so we have 
left the kinds of points we want to make here – about Derrida, about Bakhurst and 
about the ‘kinds of beings we are’ – too implicit. But we can say these things more 
slowly and more directly. 
 
Let us return to Bakhurst’s leading notion of ‘responsiveness to reasons’. We know that 
this should not be understood narrowly. Bakhurst’s notion does not commit all human 
thinking and experiencing to ‘the province of rule-following or inference’, whereby I 
recognise that certain propositions or states of affairs in the world give me reasons for 
believing something or acting in a certain way (2011, p. 177). Pursuing a discussion of 
this elsewhere in The Formation of Reason, Bakhurst points to what goes on in the 
moral domain to depict the alternative kind of conception he is after.  I notice a man 
struggling to put his shopping bags into his car and I offer to help him. My doing so is 
not based on any abstract calculation of propositions. Rather, Bakhurst suggests, it is 
based in my capacity to ‘see’ or ‘intuit’ what the present situation demands from me. 
Hence our reason responsiveness does not always – or indeed mostly – involve 
formulating articulate propositions upon which we then infer or calculate what to do. 
Rather than via the model of inference, we are better understanding reason 
responsiveness as a ‘kind of perceptual capacity’ (p. 176).  
 
What Bakhurst says here helps to give expression, once again, to his intention to 
defend a broad picture of rational thought. Human beings are not standing back and 
detachedly surveying the world in Bakhurst’s account – we are being responsive it and 
to what it suggests for our behaviour. Notably, however, Bakhurst later moves to 
emphasise how perceptual acts must themselves be understood as conceptual acts with 
conceptual content. Bakhurst justifies this on account of McDowell’s argument 
concerning the possibility of sense perception as such (his rejection of ‘the given’). But I 
wonder, yet again, whether the language of concepts has allowed something to get away 
from us here. The richer sense of worldly comportment that Bakhurst seeks to invoke 
in his appeal to moral thinking seems constrained by the conceptual bounding. And, 
indeed, perception has itself been taken as a model for precisely the kind of grasp and 
grip of the world that we found in the traditional view of concepts.  
 
Notably, when trying to characterise a form of receptivity that gets beyond limiting 
models of thought, Heidegger developed a thematic of listening. Derrida, perhaps with 
an eye on the potentially still-too-pious overtones in Heidegger’s construal, prefers to 
talk in terms of reading. Of course, the kind of a ‘reading’ Derrida invokes is not 
suggestive of some kind of immersion into a great body of texts. He is not advocating 
‘reading’ for the purposes of cultural assimilation. What Derrida says here does relate 
to the practice of reading literature, however – insofar as this is understood as a practice 
of learning to become attentive to language. Let me elaborate a little more. When we 
read a poem or a text, we engage in a process of interpretation. Part of what this 
involves, of course, is trying to work out what a poem means or says to us. But we 
would be quite inadequate readers of literature if we thought of this in terms of a 
process of standing ‘opposite’ a poem or text, turning it over, peering inside, looking at 
it from all angles, in order to gain a fully comprehensive understanding. It is a careless 
and unscrupulous reader who thinks she grasps a poem or text without remainder. This 
is not simply a negative claim regarding literature’s resistance to meaning. It is rather to 
say something about the very nature of what literature, and our ‘reading’ of literature, is. 
For we do not come to poems and texts from a position of mastery and domination - 
there is a space around a poem and a text that overflows and resists any attempt at final 
interpretation. This ‘space of literature’ serves as a metonym for the more general 
‘space of language’ that, for Derrida, is the horizon in which and through which we live 
our lives. And what we are called to here is not the grasping hand of knowledge – but 
the openness of judgement. 
 
I just spoke about judgement. Another way of talking about this is to say that we are 
here engaged in responsible ways of thinking. This invokes an argument I have made 
elsewhere regarding the ‘receptive and ‘responsible’ nature of human thinking (2015; 
2016). I attempted there to show how a Heideggerian perspective re-orientates us as 
receptive to the world, insofar as the revealing and concealing we enact as we live our 
lives as human beings is conditioned upon the world’s first being opened and present to 
us. Yet I highlighted that this also makes us responsible beings insofar as our opening 
up of the world happens in ways that we can never fully manage and control – the world 
is opened by and through what we say and what we do. A Derridean account builds on 
this. For what we are moved towards with Derrida is a way of thinking that would 
incorporate a responsiveness to what comes (which, let us recall, Bakhurst himself 
keeps open), but also gestures towards what is (yet) to come – to borrow Paul Standish’s 
phrasing (2016, p. 9). It is a form of receptivity, then, that has built into it a sense of 
address and of invocation. Elaboration of these points regrettably goes beyond the 
scope of the present paper. But part of what is at stake here is the recognition that, just 
as our response to a text or a poem is conditioned by a prior addresses or call to 
thinking – which we can never fully meet insofar as there is always something 
‘unclaimed’ in the text – so too is human thinking itself a responsiveness that begins in 
an address or call, which we are never fully adequate to and which remains beyond us. 
Hence our thinking begins, inescapably, in responsibility – in a response that is at the 
same time an infinite openness to what is still to come. 
 
‘To Catch at and Let Go’ 
 
For the sub-title of this paper, I have borrowed a line from Robert Browning’s poem, 
‘Two in the Campagna’. Browning’s poem could be read as an exploration of the 
transience of time, of the passing nature of love and of human finitude. It reflects on 
such themes in the context of a lover’s inability to be and remain fully present within an 
intense experience with his beloved. Later in the poem, after the line we have iterated, 
comes the imperative: ‘Hold it fast!’ – which is itself soon frustrated (‘/then the good 
minute goes …’). One of the things Browning’s poem brings us to question here is the 
apparent psychological need we have as human beings to keep a hold on things – to 
keep things fully ‘there’ and present – and whether this is reflective of a more general 
sense that, in doing so, we serve to make things more significant, more genuine, more 
true. 
 
I cannot pursue this thought too much further here. Yet in bringing our discussion to a 
close, it is perhaps worth reflecting on whether part of what is so compelling about a 
conceptually driven account of ‘the kinds of beings we are’ such as that developed by 
Bakhurst is that it opens a rich picture of human thought, while at the same time 
appealing to our desire to have something firm to hold on to. Philosophers, after all, 
feel that with talk of the ‘conceptual’ they reach something stable and secure, something 
that is, even, clear and true.x In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that such talk 
should be dispensed with as some psychological ruse. And, as I have said, there is 
much that is rich and compelling in Bakhurst’s account. Yet what I have attempted to 
explore in this paper is whether we might, nevertheless, need to go a way further in our 
understanding of ‘the kinds of beings we are’ – and whether the conceptual idiom, in 
the end, holds us back from doing so. The apparent clarity that comes from talking in 
terms of concepts might, after all, obscure the ways we ‘catch at and let go’.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
NOTES 
 
i In the philosophical literature, notably recent examples are the collection of essays in Schear, 
2013 and Taylor and Dreyfus, 2015. In philosophy of education, see Standish, 2016a and 
Derry 2016. 
ii I am grateful to David Bakhurst for his permission to quote from this paper.	  
iii See for example Dan Zhavai (2013, p. 326), who has admitted concern that ‘Dreyfus doesn’t 
propose or offer an alternative conception of the mind and the mental’. Lee Braver makes a 
similar objection (2013). Paul Standish has also criticised Dreyfus on similar grounds (2016a). 
iv I am grateful to Paul Standish for his suggestions on this section. 
v One source of evidence often cited here is Plato’s disparaging discussion of the myth of the 
invention of writing in the Phaedrus. Christopher Norris (1987, chapter 3) gives a good account 
of this. 
vi I am here employing a similar claim to one made by Derrida against John Austin, as is 
helpfully clarified by Simon Glendinning (2001). 
vii John Keats, Letter to Benjamin Bailey. 
viii Although McDowell himself does not seem to speak about language in these terms – and in 
Mind and World he refers with apparent approval to Michael Dummett’s saying that language 
is an instrument of thought. There is, of course, another tradition in ‘analytic’ philosophy that is 
attentive to such productive potential – for example the work of John Austin on the 
performative 
ix There is not the space to develop Derrida’s metaphorics of the ‘trace’ and the ‘ghostly’ here, 
but I have sought to develop these elsewhere (2016a).  
x I am grateful to Paul Standish for his suggestions on this idea. 
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